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Abstract—We consider a single-cell downlink massive MIMO
communication in the presence of an adversary capable of jam-
ming and eavesdropping simultaneously. We show that massive
MIMO communication is naturally resilient to no training-phase
jamming attack in which the adversary jams only the data com-
munication and eavesdrops both the data communication and the
training. Specifically, we show that the secure degrees of freedom
(DoF ) attained in the presence of such an attack is identical to the
maximum DoF attained under no attack. Further, we evaluate
the number of antennas that base station (BS) requires in order
to establish information theoretic security without even a need
for Wyner encoding. Next, we show that things are completely
different once the adversary starts jamming the training phase.
Specifically, we consider an attack, called training-phase jamming
in which the adversary jams and eavesdrops both the training
and the data communication. We show that under such an attack,
the maximum secure DoF is equal to zero. Furthermore, the
maximum achievable rates of users vanish even in the asymptotic
regime in the number of BS antennas. To counter this attack, we
develop a defense strategy in which we use a secret key to encrypt
the pilot sequence assignments to hide them from the adversary,
rather than encrypt the data. We show that, if the cardinality
of the set of pilot signals are scaled appropriately, hiding the
pilot signal assignments from the adversary enables the users
to achieve secure DoF , identical to the maximum achievable
DoF under no attack. Finally, we discuss how computational
cryptography is a legitimate candidate to hide the pilot signal
assignments. Indeed, while information theoretic security is not
achieved with cryptography, the computational power necessary
for the adversary to achieve a non-zero mutual information
leakage rate goes to infinity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive MIMO is one of the highlights of the envisioned
5G communication systems. In massive MIMO paradigm, the
base station is equipped with a number of antennas, typically
much larger than the number of users served. Combined
with a TDD-based transmission, this solves many of the
issues pertaining channel state information. In particular, the
base station exploits law-of-large-numbers-like certainties as
it serves each user over a combination of a large number of
channels.
While many issues behind the design of multicellular mas-
sive MIMO systems have been studied thoroughly, security
of massive MIMO has not been actively addressed. Part of
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the reason for this may be the fact that, there is a vast
literature on the security of MIMO systems in general, and
a common perspective is that massive MIMO is merely an
extension of MIMO as it pertains to security. However, we
demonstrate that massive MIMO has unique vulnerabilities,
and standard approaches to MIMO security do not address
them directly. Instead, these approaches focus on issues that
massive MIMO is naturally immune to. Furthermore, we argue
that, common models used in MIMO security eliminate the
need to think on various components of the system that are
critical to understanding the vulnerabilities in security. In
particular, in massive MIMO, merely making assumptions on
available channel state information (CSI) is not sufficient,
since the actual technique the system uses to obtain CSI may
be the lead cause for some major security issues. For all
these reasons, security of massive MIMO calls for a separate
treatment of its own.
To that end, we consider the TDD-based single cell down-
link massive MIMO system developed in [3] and later read-
dressed in [1]. The adversary is hybrid, capable of jamming
and eavesdropping at the same time with its multiple antennas
and we call our system secure if secrecy, measured in full
equivocation is achieved at the adversary and arbitrarily low
probability of decoding error is achieved at the legitimate re-
ceiver. We refer to these requirements as security constraints.
We first show how massive MIMO is naturally resilient to
standard jamming and eavesdropping attacks, unless jamming
is performed during the training phase when pilot signals are
transmitted by the mobile users. We prove that, without pilot
jamming, the achievable secure degrees of freedom1(DoF ) is
identical to the maximum DoF attained under no attack, even
without the need to use a stochastic (e.g., Wyner) secrecy
encoder in the massive MIMO limit. On the other hand, as
we will show, the adversary can reduce the maximum secure
DoF and rate to zero by contaminating the pilot signal of the
targeted user via another correlated pilot signal. To address
this attack, we develop a defense strategy in which the base
station (BS) keeps the assignment of pilot signals to the users
hidden from the adversary and informs the assignments to
the users reliably. Thus, in our approach, we use computa-
tional cryptography for encrypting the pilot assignments in
the training phase. We also discuss how the consequences of
encryption of pilot assignment is fundamentally different from
the consequences of data encryption. In particular, we argue
1Our definition of degrees of freedom is different from the standard
definition. Our definition specifies how the achievable rate scales with the log
of the number of base station antennas, rather than the log of the transmission
power as in the standard definition.
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that, even if we use non-information theoretic methods (e.g.,
Diffie-Hellman) to encrypt the pilot assignments, the level of
security we achieve can be as strong as information theoretic
secrecy for all practical purposes. Note that, most of our results
are not asymptotic in the number of antennas and we specify
the number of antennas necessary to achieve certain level of
security.
The major ideas developed and demonstrated in this paper
include:
• In information-theoretic secrecy literature, it is often the
case that assumptions are made on the CSI available at
the adversary. Typically, it is assumed that the adversary
has access to the CSI for all channels in the system, with
the motivation of making the achievable security robust
with respect to the availability of CSI at the adversary.
However, we show that, with massive MIMO, it is not
important if the adversary has full CSI or not. Indeed,
we show that massive MIMO is naturally immune to
attacks during data communication phase. Instead, we
demonstrate that the major question is how the adversary
obtains CSI. In particular, we show that if the adversary is
active during the training phase, it substantially degrades
the security of data communication.
• Security in computational cryptography is based on the
assumptions on the computational power of the attackers.
Once data is encrypted, it takes an unreasonable amount
of time for a typical adversary to decrypt it without the
key. Making such an assumption on the adversary poses
a problem for security, since a sophisticated adversary
can use various tools and techniques to cut down the
time for cryptanalysis applied to recorded encrypted data.
We eliminate this shortcoming by encrypting the pilot
assignments -not the transmitted data,- using keys that
are shared via standard Diffie-Hellman. In our scheme, to
make an impact, the adversary needs to decrypt the pilot
assignment before the training phase starts. Note that, the
training phase can start immediately after the assignments
are made, leaving an arbitrarily low amount of time for
the adversary to crack the assignment (i.e., pushing the
computational power necessary to infinity). Without the
knowledge of the pilot assignment, our scheme achieves
perfect secrecy of information transmitted in the data
communication phase, even without the use of a secrecy
encoder. Thus, it is useless for the adversary to record
the received signal for future cryptanalysis, since it is
indifferent from noise.
Next, we summarize the technical contributions of our paper.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the adversary is full-
duplex, i.e., it is capable of eavesdropping and jamming the
BS-to-user communication simultaneously. In the first part of
the paper, we study an attack model in which the adversary
eavesdrops the entire communication between the BS and
users and jams only the downlink data communication (the
adversary keeps silent during the training.). Under this attack:
• We show that the maximum secure DoF is identical
to the maximum DoF achieved in the presence of no
adversary.
• We provide a novel encoding strategy, δ-conjugate beam-
forming, that provides full security, without the need for
Wyner encoding [10].
• We evaluate the number of antennas that the BS requires
in order to satisfy the security constraints.
The proposed encoding, δ-conjugate beamforming, utilizes the
fact that the correlation between the estimated BS-to-user
channel gains and the BS-to-adversary channel gains becomes
zero when the adversary does not jam during the training
phase. We observe that in order to cause a non-zero correlation
between the estimated BS-to-user channel gains and the BS-
to-adversary channel gains, the adversary has to jam the pilots
of users.
In the second part of the paper, we consider an attack
model in which the adversary eavesdrops and jams the entire
communication (including the training) between the BS and
the users. Under this attack:
• We show that, if the adversary jams the training such
that there exists a non-zero correlation between the BS-
to-adversary channel gain and the estimated gain of the
channel from the BS to a user, the adversary reduces the
maximum secure DoF to zero. Further, we show that,
if the amount of the correlation is sufficiently large, the
maximum achievable rate of the user also vanishes as the
number of antennas at the BS grows.
• We propose a counter strategy against the adversary. We
show that, if the cardinality of the set of pilot signals
scales with the number of antennas at the BS and the BS
is able to keep the pilot signal assignments hidden from
the adversary, attained secure DoF is arbitrarily close to
the maximum DoF attained under no attack.
Related Work: Massive MIMO concept was first proposed
in [3], [4]. Since then, there has been a flurry of studies
focusing on different aspects of massive MIMO (see sur-
vey [5]) such as channel estimation, energy efficiency, and
pilot contamination. However, while MIMO security has been
an active area of research [6], [7], [8], issues specific to
massive MIMO have not been considered. Among the very
few, in [9], the authors consider downlink multi cell massive
MIMO system in the presence of an adversary that only
eavesdrops. In order to confuse the adversary, the BS transmits
artificial noise from a set of its antennas. The authors conclude
that, if the adversary has sufficiently large number of antennas,
it is impossible to operate at a positive rate with artificial noise
generation at the BS. In our earlier work [2], which sets up
the main results in this paper, we have focused on a fairly
different model and addressed other questions. For instance,
our attack model considers both jamming and eavesdropping,
possibly simultaneously by the adversary.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a multi user MIMO downlink communication
system, depicted in Figure 1, including a base station (BS),
User 1 
User K 
Adversary Base station 
(𝑀𝑀 antennas) (𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒  antennas) 
(Single antenna) 
(Single antenna) 
Fig. 1. System Model
K single-antenna users, and an adversary. The BS equipped
with M antennas wishes to broadcast K distinct messages
[W1, . . . ,WK ] each of which is intended for a different user.
The adversary is equipped with Me antennas.
A. Channel Model
We assume all the channels in our system, illustrated
in Figure 1, are block fading. In the block fading channel
model, time is divided into discrete blocks each of which
contains T channel uses. The channel gains remain constant
within a block and the channel gains on different blocks
are independent and identically distributed. Furthermore, we
assume the channels are reciprocal; the instantaneous gain of
the channel connecting the BS to a user is as same as the gain
of the channel connecting to the same user to the BS.
We follow a TDD-based two-phase transmission scheme
introduced in [11] and is re-adressed in [1]. The signal
transmission in a block is separated into two phases: training
phase and data communication phase. On the first Tr channel
uses of every block, each user sends a pilot signal to the BS.
The BS estimates each BS-to-user channel from the observed
pilot signals. On the last Td channel uses of each block
(Td , T − Tr), the BS transmits data to the users.
The observed signals during a data communication phase at
k-th user and at the adversary at a particular channel use of
i-th block are as follows2:
Yk = Hk(i)X +Hjam,k(i)Vjam + Vk (1)
Z = He(i)X + Ve, (2)
where Yk is a received complex signal at k-th user, Z is
a received Me × 1 complex vector at the adversary, and X
denotes M × 1 complex vector of transmitted data symbols.
Signals Vk and Ve are additive Gaussian noise components,
distributed as CN(0, 1) and CN(0, IMe), respectively. Signal
Vjam denotes Me × 1 complex vector of jamming signal.
Further, Hk(i) and Hjam,k(i) denote a 1 × M complex
gain vector of the channel connecting the base station to
k-th user, a 1 × Me complex gain vector of the channel
2Except for the channel gains, we avoid the block and channel use indices
in (1) and (2) and the block indicies in (3) and (4) for the sake of simplicity.
connecting the adversary to k-th user, respectively, at i-
th block. Similarly, He(i) is the Me × M complex gain
matrix of the MIMO channel connecting the base station
to the adversary at i-th block. We assume that all channel
gains He(i), H1(i), . . . HK(i), Hjam,1(i), . . . ,Hjam,K(i) are
mutually independent for any i ≥ 1.
The users send pilots in the first Tr channel uses of each
block. The received signals at the BS and at the adversary in
the training phase of i-th block are as follows:
Y Tr =
K∑
k=1
HTk (i)φk +H
T
e (i)Wjam +W, (3)
ZTr =
K∑
k=1
HTjam,k(i)φk +We, (4)
where Y Tr and ZTr denote M × Tr and Me × Tr complex
matrices of the received signals over Tr channel uses at the
BS and at the adversary, respectively. Signals W and We
are M × Tr and M × Tr complex matrices denoting the
additive Gaussian noise. Each element of W and We are i.i.d
CN(0, 1). Signal Vjam denotes Me × Tr complex matrix of
jamming signal. Signal φk is 1× Tr complex vector denoting
the pilot signal associated with k-th user. The power of pilot
signals ρr, i.e., 1Tr tr (φ
∗
kφk) = ρr is identical for all users
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
We assume that the users do not have the knowledge of the
BS-to-user channel gains. Note that the BS, the users, and the
adversary know pilot signal set [φ1, . . . , φK ]. The adversary is
assumed to be aware of which pilot signal is assigned to which
user. Utilizing the pilot signals, the BS estimates the BS-to-
user channel gains. Define Hˆk(i) as 1×M complex vector of
estimated BS-to-k-th user channel gain. Further, for any B ≥
1, define HB , HˆB , HBe , and H
B
jam as the gains of the BS-to-
user channels, the estimated gains of the BS-to-user channels,
the gains of the BS-to-adversary channel, and the gains of the
adversary-to-user channels over B blocks, respectively, i.e.,
HB ,
[
HB1 , . . . ,H
B
K
]
, HˆB ,
[
HˆB1 , . . . , Hˆ
B
K
]
and HBjam ,[
HBjam,1, . . . ,H
B
jam,K
]
.
For any B ≥ 1, the joint probability density function of(
HB , HˆB , HBe , H
B
jam
)
is
pHB ,HˆB ,HBe ,HBjam
(
hB , hˆB , hBe , h
B
jam
)
=
B∏
i=1
pH,Hˆ,He,Hjam
(
h(i), hˆ(i), he(i), hjam(i)
)
(5)
where H , [H1, . . . ,HK ], Hˆ ,
[
H1, . . . , H˜K
]
, and Hjam ,
[Hjam,1, . . . ,Hjam,K ]. For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, Hk and
Hjam,k are distributed as CN(0, IM ), CN(0, IMe), respec-
tively, and each element of matrix He is i.i.d CN(0, 1).
The adversary has the perfect knowledge of the BS-to-user
channel gains H and the estimated BS-to-user channel gains
Hˆ . Define Hkm and Hˆkm as the gain and the estimated gain
of the channel connecting m-th BS antenna to k-th user. We
assume that for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, {HkmHˆkm}m≥1 forms
an i.i.d process. We also assume that Hˆk are independent with
Hl and E
[
HˆkHˆ
∗
l
]
= 0 for k 6= l and k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Note that we do not impose these assumptions for the BS-to-
adversary channels.
Remark 1. When MMSE estimator and mutually orthogonal
pilot signals are employed at the BS for channel estimation,
these assumptions are satisfied.
B. Attack Model
We consider a full duplex adversary that is capable of
eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. In the sequel, we
consider two attack models that differ only in the adversary’s
jamming activity in the training phase.
In Section III, we consider an attack model in which the
adversary jams only during the data communication phase
and eavesdrops both the training and the data communication
phases. We call this attack model as no training-phase jam-
ming. In the no training-phase jamming, the adversary jams
during the communication phase using a Gaussian jamming
signal and keeps silent during the training phase. Specifically,
signal Wjam in (4) is identical to zero and jamming signal
Vjam in (1) is distributed as CN(0, ρjamIMe), where ρjam is
the jamming power.
In Sections IV and V, we consider an attack model in
which the adversary jams and eavesdrops both the training
and the data communication phases. We call this attack model
as training-phase jamming. The adversary strategy during the
data communication phase in this attack model is the same as
that described in the previous attack model (i.e., no training-
phase jamming). Instead of jamming with random signals,
the adversary jams during the training phase with structured
signals. We provide a detailed description of the signals used
for jamming the training phase in Section IV and V.
C. Code Definition
The BS aims to send message wk ∈ Wk, k = 1, . . . ,K,
to k-th user over B blocks with rate Rk, while keeping wk
secret from the adversary. The BS and the users employ code(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
of length BTd, that contains:
1) K message sets, Wk , {1, . . . , 2BTRk}, k = 1, . . . ,K.
2) K injective encoding functions, fk, k = 1, . . . ,K, where
fk maps wk ∈ Wk to data signal sequence sBTdk ∈ CBTd
satisfying an average power constraint such that
1
BTd
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
|sk(i, j)|2 ≤ ρk, k = 1, . . . ,K (6)
for all wk ∈ WK , where notation (i, j) indicates the j-th
channel use of i-th block, ρk denotes the power constraint
for k-th user, and sk(i, j) is the complex data signal of k-
th user. Note that ρf ,
∑K
k=1 ρk is the cumulative average
transmission power. Further, note that encoding functions,
fk, k = 1, . . . ,K can be deterministic or stochastic. Codes
using stochastic encoding functions referred to as stochastic
codes and the ones using deterministic encoding functions are
referred to as deterministic codes.
3) Linear beamforming that maps data signals3 sBTd1 × · · · ×
sBTdK to channel input
4 XBTd . Two beamforming strategies
are used throughout the paper:
• Conjugate beamforming: When the BS employs conju-
gate beamforming, channel input at j-th channel use of
i-th block can be written as
X(i, j) =
K∑
k=1
sk(i, j)
Hˆ∗k(i)√
Mαk
, (8)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , B} and j ∈ {Tτ + 1, . . . , T}, where
αk , E
[
|Hˆkm |2
]
.
• δ-conjugate beamforming: We introduce a new beam-
forming strategy, called δ-conjugate beamforming that is
slightly modified version of conjugate beamforming. Let
δ be a positive real number. When the BS employs δ-
conjugate beamforming, the channel input at j-th channel
use of i-th block can be written as
X(i, j) =
K∑
k=1
sk(i, j)
Hˆ∗k(i)√
M1+δαk
. (9)
Note that, when δ = 0, δ-conjugate beamforming be-
comes identical with conjugate beamforming in (8).
4) Decoding functions, gk, k = 1, . . . ,K, where gk maps
Y BTdk to wˆk ∈Wk.
D. Figures of Merit
We define the average error probability of code(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
as
Pe , P
(
K⋃
k=1
gk(Y
BTd) 6= Wk
)
,
where Wk is uniformly distributed on Wk. We assume that
the adversary targets a single user during communication. The
secrecy of the transmitted message for k-th user is measured
by the equivocation rate at the adversary, which is equal to
the entropy rate of transmitted message wk conditioned on
the adversary’s observations.
Definition 1. A secure rate tuple R1, . . . RK is said to be
achievable if, for any  > 0, there exists B() > 0 and a
sequence of codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
that satisfy the
following:
Pe ≤ , (10)
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBT , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
≥ Rk −  (11)
3Note that sBTdk , {sk(i, j)}i=1:B,j=Tr+1:T and notation (·)BTd
applied to any variable has the same meaning.
4Note that the channel input sequence satisfies the following average power
constraint
1
BTd
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
E
[||X(i, j)||2] ≤ ρf (7)
for all w1 × · · · × wK ∈ W1 × · · · ×WK , where the expectation is over
estimated channel gains Hˆ . The inequality (7) follows from the individual
power constraint (6) and from the fact that E
[
HˆkHˆ
∗
l
]
= 0 for k 6= l
for all B ≥ B() and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where ZBT is the
received signal sequence at the adversary over BT channel
uses.
We refer to the constraints in (10) and (11) as decodability
and secrecy constraints, respectively. We also refer to both
constraints as security constraints. We call the communication
system information theoretically secure if both constraints are
satisfied. Notice that the achievable rate tuple definition above
is presented for a given M , i.e., M remains constant for a
sequence of codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
, B ≥ B().
In this paper, we mainly focus on the massive MIMO
limit. Specifically, we study on how achievable rate tuple
R1, . . . , RK behaves as M goes to infinity. To that end, we
use the following notion of degrees of freedom for each user.
Definition 2. A secure degrees of freedom tuple d1, . . . , dK
is said to be achievable, if there exists achievable rate tuple
R1, . . . RK such that
dk = lim
M→∞
Rk
logM
, k = 1, . . . ,K. (12)
In the literature, degrees of freedom is typically defined as
the limit limρk→∞
Rk
log ρk
. Since we aim to understand how
Rk changes with M under constant ρk, the degree of freedom
definition in (12) is more relevant for our interest.
For a given achievable secure degrees of freedom tuple
d1, . . . , dK , we define the secure degrees of freedom of the
downlink communication as the minimum value in the tuple,
i.e., secure DoF , mink∈{1,...,K} dk. In the rest of the
paper, when we use secure DoF , we mean secure degrees
of freedom attained in the presence of an adversary, and when
we use DoF , we mean degrees of freedom attained under no
adversary.
In this paper, we characterize the maximum secure DoF
in the presence of various security attacks described in Sec-
tion II-B. Furthermore, we aim to develop defense strategies
that achieve the maximum secure DoF against the security
attacks that would limit the maximum secure DoF to zero,
otherwise.
III. ADVERSARY NOT JAMMING THE TRAINING PHASE
In this section, we show that downlink communication in a
single-cell massive MIMO system is resilient to the adversary
that jams only the data communication phase and eavesdrops
both the communication and training phases. We show that
the maximum secure DoF attained under no training-phase
jamming is identical to maximum DoF attained under no
adversary. Then, we show that we can establish information
theoretic security without using stochastic encoding, e.g.,
Wyner encoding. Finally, we evaluate the number of antennas
that BS needs to satisfy the security constraints without a need
for Wyner encoding.
A. Resilience of massive MIMO
In this subsection, we evaluate the maximum secure DoF
of the downlink communication in the presence of no training-
phase jamming. Then, we show that the maximum secure DoF
attained in the presence of no training-phase jamming is as
same as the maximum DoF attained without an adversary.
This result demonstrates the weakness of the no training-phase
jamming in the massive MIMO limit.
Theorem 1. (Maximum secure DoF) For given block length
T and data transmission phase length Td, the maximum
secure DoF under no training-phase jamming is given by
Td
T . 2
The complete proof is available in Appendix A, where we
first provide an upper bound on secure DoF and then present
a strategy to achieve the upper bound. Here, we provide a
proof sketch. In order to find an upper bound on secure
DoF , we consider a multiple output single output (MISO)
communication system without an adversary, in which the
BS communicates to a single user under power constraint ρf .
Further, we assume that the BS and the user have a perfect
information of the channel gains. We show that the supremum
of achievable rates leads to a secure DoF of TdT . Hence, we
conclude that TdT is an upper bound on secure DoF attained in
the multi user downlink communication model in Section II.
We now describe a strategy to attain the maximum secure
DoF in Theorem 1. On the first Tr channel uses of each block,
the users send pilot signals that are mutually orthogonal.
The BS uses minimum mean square estimator (MMSE) to
estimate the BS-to-user channel gains. The BS constructs K
codebooks, ck , k = 1, . . . ,K, where codebook ck contains
2BTRˆk independently and identically generated codewords,
sBTdk of length BTd and Rˆk > Rk. The BS maps k-th user’s
message to a codeword with a stochastic mapping function
fk. Specifically, the BS maps message wk ∈
{
1, . . . , 2BTRk
}
to randomized message mk ∈ {1, . . . , 2BTRˆk} as in [10] and
then maps randomized message mk to one of the codewords
in ck , k = 1, . . . ,K. Utilizing the conjugate beamforming
in (8), the BS maps K codewords, sBTdk , k = 1, . . . ,K to
channel input sequence XBTd . Each user employs typical set
decoding [12]. In order to show that secrecy constraint (11)
for a particular user is satisfied, we give the adversary the
other users’ transmitted codewords. 2
In the next couple of remarks, we emphasize the robustness
of the downlink communication system against no training-
phase jamming.
Remark 2. (The weakness of the adversary not jamming
the training phase) In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that
Td
T is indeed an upper bound on the DoF of a downlink
communication without the presence of an adversary. Hence,
with also showing that the secure DoF of TdT is attained in
the presence of the adversary, we conclude that no training-
phase jamming attack does not degrade the performance of the
communication in terms of DoF . The reason that secure DoF
of TdT is achieved is that the adversary keeps silent during the
training phase; hence the estimated BS-to-user channel gains
are independent with He.
Fig. 2. The variation of Rk with M and Me
In the next section, we consider an adversary jamming the
training phase. In the presence of such an adversary, the BS-
to-user channel gains become correlated with He and the
maximum secure DoF is reduced to zero.
Remark 3. (Resource race between the BS and the
adversary) In Appendix A, we show that the achievable
rate tuple that leads to a secure DoF of TdT is Rk =
Td
T log
(
1 + Mρkaρf+ρjam+1
)
− TdT log (1 +Meρk), k = 1, . . . ,K,
where a , ρrTrρrTr+1 .
We next investigate how Rk varies in Me and M . Figure 2
illustrates this variation when ρk = 1, ρf = 10, TdT = 0.99,
ρjam = 1, and a = 0.9. As seen in Figure 2, in the presence of
the adversary not jamming the training phase, the achievable
secure rates are determined as a result of the arms race
between the adversary and the BS. Specifically, we can
observe that if Me remains constant, achievable rate Rk grows
unboundedly as M is increasing. Moreover, for a fixed value
of M , the achievable rates decrease as a function of Me.
In the next section, we consider an adversary jamming the
training phase instead of keeping silent during the training
phase. We will show that, armed with only a single antenna,
the adversary is capable of limiting the maximum achievable
rate for any user to zero as M →∞. Hence, by jamming the
training phase, the adversary converts the arms race between
the BS and itself to the one between an user and itself.
B. Establishing security without Wyner encoding
In the achievability strategy given in the proof sketch of
Theorem 1, we use a stochastic encoding, a randomized
mapping of each message to a codeword with stochastic
functions, at the BS. In fact, stochastic encoding, e.g., Wyner
encoding [10], is a standard technique in the literature for
establishing information theoretic security against the eaves-
dropping attacks.
In this section, we show that the BS utilizing determin-
istic encoding, a nonrandom mapping of each message to a
codeword with deterministic functions, instead of stochastic
encoding is capable of satisfying the security constraints if it
is equipped with sufficiently large number antennas. In order to
satisfy the security constraints without using stochastic encod-
ing, the BS employs novel beamforming strategy introduced
in (9).
The following theorem shows that, when code(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
of length BTd utilizes δ-
conjugate beamforming instead of conjugate beamforming
in (8), the code satisfies the secrecy constraint in (11) for
any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and for any  > 0 without a need for
stochastic encoding.
Theorem 2. (Establishing secrecy with no stochastic en-
coding) Let δ > 0. Under no training-phase jamming,
for any  > 0, if M ≥ S(), then any determinis-
tic code
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
employing δ-conjugate
beamforming satisfies
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
≥ Rk −  (13)
for all B ≥ 1 and for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where
S() ,
(
Meρmax
2
T
Td
 − 1
) 1
δ
and ρmax , maxk∈{1,...,K} ρk. 2
We can consider S() in Theorem 2 as the number of the
antennas the BS needs in order to make the conditional entropy
-close to Rk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Hence the BS equipped
with at least S() antennas can satisfy (13) by harnessing any
code
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
that employs deterministic
encoding functions and δ-conjugate beamforming.
The proof is available in Appendix B-A. The BS constructs
K codebooks, ck , k = 1, . . . ,K, where codebook ck contains
2BTRk codewords, sBTdk of length BTd. The BS maps message
wk to sBTdk codeword with a deterministic function, fk, k =
1, . . . ,K. Utilizing the δ-conjugate beamforming in (9), the
BS maps K codewords, sBTdk , k = 1, . . . ,K to channel input
sequence XBTd .
In Figure 3, we illustrate the variation of S() with  when
ρk = 1, δ = 0.7, T/Td = 5/4, and Me = 1. As seen in
Figure 3, 100 antennas at the BS are sufficient to make the
equivocation rate above Rk − 0.05 for any choice of Rk, k =
1, . . . ,K.
Theorem 2 evaluates the number of antennas needed in
order to satisfy only the secrecy constraint. The following
corollary takes both the secrecy and decodability constraints
into account.
Corollary 1. (Any rate tuple is achievable with no need
to stochastic encoding) Let 0 < δ < 1. In the presence of no
training-phase jamming, for any  > 0 and any rate tuple R ,
[R1, . . . , RK ], if M ≥ max (V (R), S()), there exists B() >
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.110
1
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103
 
S(
ε)
ε
Fig. 3. The variation of S() with  when ρk = 1, δ = 0.7, T/Td = 5/4,
and Me = 1. As long as M ≥ S(), 1BT H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
remains -neighborhood of Rk for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
0 and sequence of codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
, B ≥
B() that satisfy the constraints in (10) and (11) without the
use of stochastic encoding, where
V (R) , max
k∈{1,...,K}
((
2
Rk
T
Td − 1
)
× ρf + ρjam + 1
aρk
) 1
1−δ
.
2
The proof of Corollary 1 can be found in Ap-
pendix B-B. The sequence of codes in Corollary 1 utilizes
δ-conjugate beamforming. Figure 4 illustrates the variation
of max (V (R), S()) with δ when  = 0.05, T/Td = 5/4,
Me = 1, ρk = 1, and Rk = 0.2 for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Note
that, for these parameters, max (V (R), S()) is minimized
and identical to 60 when δ = 0.78. When the BS utilizes
δ-conjugate beamforming with δ = 0.78, the BS requires at
least 60 antennas in order to satisfy the constraints in (10) and
(11) without the need for a stochastic encoding (e.g., Wyner
encoding).
Remark 4. (Achieving secure DoF arbitrarily close the
maximum DoF with no Wyner encoding) Theorem 2 and
Corollary 1 show that it is possible to establish information
theoretic security without using stochastic encoding. We next
measure the amount of DoF sacrificed as a result of not
utilizing stochastic encoding. To that end, we evaluate how
number of antennas at the BS max(V (R), S()) scales with
Rk for given  > 0 and {Rl}l 6=k. Specifically, we calculate
limRk→∞
Rk
log max(V (R),S()) as
lim
Rk→∞
Rk
log max(V (R), S())
= lim
Rk→∞
Rk
log V (R)
(14)
= lim
Rk→∞
Rk
log
((
2
Rk
T
Td − 1
)
× ρf+ρjam+1aρk
) 1
1−δ
(15)
δ
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a
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Fig. 4. The variation of max (V (R), S()) with δ when  = 0.05, T/Td =
5/4, Me = 1, ρk = 1, and Rk = 0.2 for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. As long
as M ≥ max(S(), V (R)), constraints in (10) and (11) are satisfied for a
given  and R without a need for stochastic encoding.
= lim
Rk→∞
(1− δ)Rk
log
(
2
Rk
T
Td − 1
)
= (1− δ)Td
T
(16)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, for any  > 0 and for any {Rl}l 6=k.
The equalities in (14) and (15) in the above derivation follow
from the fact that max(V (R), S()) and V (R) are increasing
functions of Rk. We observe from (16) that by choosing δ
close to 0, we can make the difference between (16) and
the maximum secure DoF provided in Theorem 1 arbitrarily
small.
IV. ADVERSARY JAMMING THE TRAINING PHASE
In the previous section, we show that the adversary not
jamming during the training phase does not degrade the
performance of the multi user communication when the BS
has sufficiently large number of antennas. In this section, we
aim to find attack model that do degrade the performance.
Specifically, we focus on finding an attack strategy capable
of limiting secure DoF to an arbitrarily small value. Next
theorem sheds light on finding such an attack strategy.
Theorem 3. (A non-zero correlation between the estimated
user channel and the adversary channel gains limits the
maximum secure DoF to zero) Assume that there exists user
k such that
•
{
HˆkmHem
}
m≥1
is5 an i.i.d random process.
• For any B ≥ 1, there exists a random vector H˜Bk that
satisfies the following: 1) the joint probability distribution
of HBe , Hˆ
B is identical with that of HBk , H˜
B , where
H˜B , HˆB1 , . . . , H˜Bk , . . . , HˆBK and 2) the joint probability
distribution of H(i), H˜(i) is identical for any i ∈ [1 : B].
Then, the maximum secure DoF is zero if E
[
H∗emHˆkm
]
6= 0.
2
Note that random vector H˜B is created by replacing HˆBk
in HˆB with H˜Bk . The proof of Theorem 3 can be found
5Hem is the gain of the connecting m-th antenna at the BS to the adversary.
in Appendix C-A. In the example given at the end of this
section, we show that the assumptions listed in Theorem 3,
that are related to the random variables hold when MMSE
and mutually orthogonal pilot signals are used as a channel
estimation strategy. Note that such an estimation strategy is
quite popular in the multi-user communication [4].
We next give a proof sketch. Assume that conjugate beam-
forming is used at the BS and Me = 1. Note that Theorem
3 is also valid when the BS uses δ-conjugate beamforming
and Me > 1. We can convert the communication set-up
explained in Section II to an identical set-up containing a BS
equipped with K antennas, where the channel input signal at
l-th antenna in the new set-up represents the data signal for l-th
user Sl, l = 1, . . . ,K. Since conjuagte beamforming is used,
the gain of the channel connecting l-th antenna to i-th user in
the new set-up is HiHˆ
∗
l√
Mαl
and the gain of the channel connecting
l-th antenna to the adversary in the new set-up is HeHˆ
∗
l√
Mαl
,
i, l = 1, . . . ,K. Following the assumptions in Theorem 3, we
show that the gain of the channel connecting the BS to the ad-
versary can be replaced with HkHˆ
∗
1√
Mα1
, . . . ,
HkH˜
∗
k√
Mαk
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
K√
MαK
.
In Appendix C-A, we bound Rk as follows
Rk ≤ E
[[
max
Σ∈S
(log (1 +AkΣA
∗
k)
− log (1 +AeΣA∗e))]+
]
, (17)
where Ak ,
[
HkHˆ
∗
1√
Mα1
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
k√
Mαk
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
K
MαK
]
is 1×K com-
plex gain vector of channels connecting the BS to k-th user,
and Ae ,
[
HkHˆ
∗
1√
Mα1
, . . . ,
HkH˜
∗
k√
Mαk
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
K√
MαK
]
is 1×K complex
gain vector of channels connecting the BS to the adversary. Let
Σ be the covariance matrix of input signal S = [S1, . . . , SK ]
and S be the feasible set for the maximization problem in (17).
Every matrix Σ in set S is diagonal due to fact that S1, . . . , SK
are independent, and satisfy Σ  diag(ρ1, . . . , ρk) due to the
power constraint in (6).
We show that, if E
[
H∗kmHem
] 6= 0, then the right hand
side (RHS) of (17) over logM goes to zero as M → ∞.
Hence, the maximum secure DoF becomes zero. 2
Remark 5. (Adversary has to jam the training
phase) When the adversary does not jam the training
phase, Hˆk and He are independent and consequently
E
[
HˆkmH
∗
em
]
= E
[
Hˆkm
]
E
[
H∗em
]
= 0 for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. In order to have a non-zero correlation
between the gain of the channel connecting itself to the BS
He with Hˆk for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the adversary has to
jam the training phase. Hence, the training-phase jamming is
capable of limiting the maximum DoF to zero. 2
In addition to limiting the maximum secure DoF to zero,
the adversary can make the maximum achievable rate of k-
th user arbitrarily small as M → ∞. We next provide the
conditions under which the maximum achievable rate of k-th
user goes to a finite value as M →∞.
Corollary 2. (A user’s maximum achievable rate is bounded
as M → ∞) In addition to the assumptions given in Theo-
rem 3, assume that there exits a finite non negative r such that
pKM (x) ≤ r for all M ≥ 1 and x ∈ KM , where pKM is the
probability density function of KM , 1M2 ||HeHˆ∗k ||2 and KM
is the sample space of KM . Then, the achievable rate of k-th
user is bounded as
lim
M→∞
Rk ≤
log

∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2∣∣∣E [HemHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2


+
.
2
The proof of Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix C-B.
As seen in Corollary 2, if the amount of correlation between
the BS-to-k-user channel gain and the estimated BS-to-k-user
channel gain,
∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣ is smaller than that between the
BS-to-adversary channel gain and estimated BS-to-k-th user
channel gain,
∣∣∣E [HemHˆ∗km]∣∣∣, the maximum achievable rate
of k-th user vanishes as M →∞.
Remark 6. (Resource race between the adversary and the
user) We show that if there exists a non zero correlation be-
tween the BS-to-k-user channel gain and the BS-to-adversary
channel gain, then the maximum secure DoF is constrained
to zero. Furthermore, we also show that if the amount of
this correlation is higher than the amount of the correlation
between the BS-to-adversary channel gain and estimated BS-
to-k-user channel gain, the maximum achievable rate of k-th
user goes to zero as M →∞.
Hence, in the presence of the training-phase jamming,
the achievable rates and the maximum secure DoF are
determined as a result of the arms race between the
adversary and users. 2
Example 1. (Using MMSE and mutually orthogonal pilot
signals for channel estimation) We study an adversary that
chooses to match k-th user’s pilot signal on the training phase
with one of its antennas when MMSE and mutually orthogonal
pilot signals are used for channel estimation. We show that
the assumptions given in Theorem 3 are valid under such a
jamming attack and a channel estimation strategy. Then, we
show that the maximum secure DoF is zero.
We consider mutually orthogonal pilot signals {φl}l∈[1:K],
i.e.,
φk × φ∗l =
{
Trρr if k = l
0 if k 6= l
for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The received signals at the BS in
the training phase of i-th block is as follows:
Y Tr =
√
ρjam
ρr
HTe (i)φk +
K∑
l=1
HTl (i)φl +W,
where ρjam is the jamming power. Note that we assume that
the adversary jams the data communication phase and the
training phase with the same power, which is ρjam.
In order to validate the assumptions listed in Theorem 3,
we next present the estimated gain of the channel connecting
the BS to l-th user at i-th block as
Hˆl(i) =
{
aHl(i) + bHe(i) + cVl if l = k
dHl(i) + eVl if l 6= k,
where Vl is distributed as CN(0, IM ) for any l ∈
{1, . . . ,K}, a , TrρrTrρr+1+Trρjam , b ,
Tr
√
ρrρjam
Trρr+1+Trρjam
, c ,
√
Trρr
Trρr+1+Trρjam
, d , TrρrTrρr+1 and e ,
√
Trρr
Trρr+1
.
Define H˜Bk stated in Theorem 3 as H˜k(i) , bHk(i) +
aHe(i) + cVk, i = 1, . . . , B. Further, define Hˆl , aHl +
bHe + cVl if k = l, and otherwise, Hˆl , dHl + eVl. Note
that H˜k(i), H(i), He(i), Hˆ(i) is an i.i.d process due to (5)
and the associated joint distribution is identical with that of
H˜k, H,He, Hˆ , where H˜k , aHk + bHe + cVk. Hence, we
conclude that the joint probability distribution of H(i), H˜(i)
is identical for any i ∈ {1, . . . , B}.
We next show that the probability distribution of HBe , Hˆ
B
is identical with that of HBk , H˜
B . Note that both (He, Hˆk)
and (Hk, H˜k) are independent with {Hˆl}l 6=k. Hence, noting
that He and Hk have same probability distributions, it is
sufficient to show that H˜k|Hk = hk has the same probability
distribution with Hˆk|He = hk for any hk ∈ RM :
P
(
H˜k ≤ x|Hk = hk
)
= P (bhk + aHe + cVk ≤ x|Hk = hk)
= P (bhk + aHe + cVk ≤ x) (18)
= P (bhk + aHk + cVk ≤ x) (19)
= P (bHe + aHk + cVk ≤ x|He = hk) (20)
= P
(
Hˆk ≤ x|He = hk
)
for any x ∈ RM , where (18) and (20) follow from the fact that
He, Hk, and Vk are mutually independent and (19) follows
from the fact that (He, Vk) and (Hk, Vk) are identically
distributed.
Finally, note that {Hem , Hˆkm}m≥1 forms an i.i.d process
due to the fact that Hk, He, Vk are mutually independent
random vectors and each is composed of M i.i.d complex
Gaussian random variables.
Note that E
[
Hˆ∗kmHem
]
= b. Since E
[
Hˆ∗kmHem
]
is
non-zero, we conclude that the maximum secure DoF is zero
by Theorem 3. 2
V. SECURE COMMUNICATION UNDER TRAINING-PHASE
JAMMING
In the previous section, we showed that massive MIMO
systems are vulnerable to the training-phase jamming. In this
section, we first provide a defense strategy against the training-
phase jamming, that expands the cardinality of the set of pilot
signals and keeps the pilot signal assignments hidden from the
adversary. Then, we show that utilizing the defense strategy
and δ-conjugate beamforming, the BS can satisfy the security
constraints without using Wyner encoding in the presence of
the training-phase jamming. Finally, we discuss that relying
only on the computational cryptography, we can secure the
communication of pilot signal assignments; hence the entire
massive MIMO communication.
A. Counter strategy against training-phase jamming
We first describe our defense strategy against training-phase
jamming attack. Then, in Theorem 4, we show that the ratio
of the achieved rate to the logarithm of number of antennas
can be brought arbitrarily close to maximum achievable secure
DoF of TdT with the proposed defense strategy that will be
explained next.
The BS constructs pilot signal set Φ containing L mutually
orthogonal pilot signals, i.e., Φ = {φ1, . . . , φL}, where L is
larger than the number of users in the system, L ≥ K. Thus,
the number the pilot signals is increased. At the beginning of
each block, the BS draws K pilot signals from set Φ uniformly
at random and assigns each of them to a different user. Let
ΦK(i) = [φ1(i), . . . , φK(i)] be K pilot signals that the BS
picks at the beginning of i-th block, where φk(i) ∈ Φ is the
pilot signal assigned to k-th user on i-th block.
Throughout sections V-A and V-B, we assume that the BS
communicates to the users the assignments of pilot signals
reliably while keeping the assignments hidden from the ad-
versary. In Section V-C, we discuss how this can be achieved.
In particular, we consider computational cryptography as a
way to communicate the pilot signal assignments and discuss
the notion of security achieved.
We next describe the attack model in detail, under the lack
of knowledge of the pilot signal assignments. Suppose that
the adversary targets k-th user without loss of generality. The
adversary eavesdrops the entire communication between user
k and the BS and simultaneously jams data communication
phase with Gaussian noise as in no training-phase jamming
attack model. Furthermore, the adversary, without knowing
which pilot signal is assigned to which user, picks J ≤ L
pilot signals uniformly at random from set Φ at the beginning
of a block and subsequently jams these pilot signals with an
equal power during the training phase. The adversary repeats
this process independently at the beginning of each block.
Particularly, the adversary divides its jamming power and
transmits an equally weighted combination of J randomly
selected pilot signals using all of its Me antennas with total
transmission power ρjamJ . The signal received by the BS
during the training phase under this attack model can be
written as follows:
Y Tr =
K∑
l=1
HTl φl +
∑
l∈J
Me∑
n=1
√
ρjam
MeJρr
HTenφl +W, (21)
where Y Tr denotes M × Tr complex matrix of the received
signals over Tr channel uses at the BS, Hen is 1×M complex
gain vector of the channel connecting n-th antenna at the
adversary to the BS, and J is the set of pilot signals that are
selected and transmitted by the adversary at the corresponding
block. Note that J is a random set that can possibly change in
each block and |J| = J .
Next theorem shows that when the cardinality, L of pilot
signal set is increased as a function of the number of BS
antennas in a certain way, the ratio of attained secure rate to
logM for any user can be arbitrarily close to the maximum
DoF attained in the presence of no adversary.
Theorem 4. (Achievable rate under training-phase jamming)
For given block length T and data transmission phase length
Td, the achievable secure rate, Rk under training-phase jam-
ming satisfies
Rk
logM
≥ Td
T
min(1, γ)−  (22)
for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, J ∈ {1, . . . Tr},  > 0, and γ > 0 if
max(Mγ ,K) ≤ Tr and M ≥ G(), where
G() ,
((
1 +Meρmax +
Meρmaxρjam
ρr
)
×(ρf + ρjam + 1)× ρr + ρjam + 1
ρminρr
)Td
T
, (23)
ρmax , maxk∈{1,...,K} ρk, and ρmin , mink∈{1,...,K} ρk. 2
Note that the lower bound to RklogM in (22) does not
depend on how many pilot signals the adversary chooses
to contaminate. The proof of Theorem 4 can be found in
Appendix D.
Remark 7. (Attained RklogM is arbitrarily close to maximum
DoF under no attack) We can observe from the statement of
Theorem 4 that when γ = 1, RklogM that is arbitrarily close to
the maximum DoF attained under no attack can be achieved.
In order to attain that amount of RklogM , the length of the
training phase Tr is expanded so that Tr ≥ max(K,G()) for
given  > 0 and the size of pilot signal set is set to Tr instead
of K. Hence, we sacrifice the some of secure throughput by
increasing the training overhead. However, as illustrated in
the next example, the typical values for the block lengths for
mobile wireless communication systems is sufficiently large to
keep the overhead ratio, TrT reasonably low.
Example 2. In this example, we consider massive MIMO
downlink transmission to users moving at a speed 10 m/s
and the transmitted signal bandwidth is 10 MHz, centered
at 1 GHz The associated coherence time corresponds T to
as 3 × 105 channel uses. We first evaluate the number of
antennas required to keep Rk in  neighborhood of TdT for
a given training phase length Tr. To that end, we plot the
variation of G() with  in Figure 5, when γ = 1, Td = 2×105
channel uses, pjam = 1, K = 5, pf = 5, Me = 1, pr = 10,
pk = 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. For these set of parameters,
200 antennas are sufficient to keep RklogM larger than
Td
T −0.3,
where TdT =
2
3 .
Next we study the trade-off between  and TdT for given
ǫ
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Fig. 5. The change of G() with 
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Fig. 6. The change of  in (22) and Td
T
with Tr
T
M , where  is the deviation of achieved RklogM from
Td
T as in
(22). To that end, we plot the variation of  and TdT with
Tr
T
for M = 200 as we change TrT from
200
3×105 to 1. The values
of parameters pjam, K, Me, ρk, and ρf are kept same as
stated above and we set ρr = TdTr ρf . As seen in Figure 6, 
vanishes as Tr goes to T and hence RklogM also gets closer to
Td
T . However, as Tr increases, the training overhead increases
and hence maximum DoF TdT decreases.
Remark 8. (Resource race between the adversary and the
BS) By keeping the pilot assignments hidden from the adver-
sary and using a pilot signal set that scales with M , the BS
converts the arms race between the adversary and the target
user (which was the case with known pilot assignments),
back to the one between the adversary and itself. Indeed, the
power of the adversary needs to scale with L for it to make
an impact.
B. Establishing security without Wyner encoding
In this subsection, we show that the BS, when utilizing
deterministic encoding instead of stochastic encoding is still
capable of satisfying the secrecy and decodability constraints
in the presence of training-phase jamming. Hence, this sub-
section can be considered as the counterpart of Section III-B.
There, we assumed no training phase jamming, whereas here
we mitigate training-phase jamming by other means.
In order to satisfy the security constraints without using
stochastic encoding, the BS employs δ-conjugate beamforming
given in (9) and the strategy explained in Section V-A.
Specifically, Theorem 5 and Corollary 3 provide the number
of antennas that the BS requires in order to satisfy only
the secrecy constraint and both the secrecy and decodability
constraints, respectively. Note that Theorem 5 and Corollary 3
are the counterparts of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
Theorem 5. (Establishing secrecy with no stochastic encod-
ing) Let δ, γ > 0, and γ + δ > 1. Let block length be T
and length of data transmission phase be Td. In the presence
of training-phase jamming, for any  > 0 and any rate tuple
R , [R1, . . . , RK ], if M ≥ S1() and Tr ≥ max(Mγ ,K),
then any deterministic code
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
em-
ploying δ-conjugate beamforming satisfies
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
≥ Rk −  (24)
for any J ∈ {1, . . . , Tr}, B ≥ 1, and k ∈ [1 : K], where
S1() ,
ρmaxMe max
(
1,
ρjam
ρr
)
2
T
Td
 − 1

1
min(δ,δ+γ−1)
and ρmax , maxk∈{1,...,K} ρk. 2
The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in Appendix E-A.
Note that when γ = 1 and 1 ≥ ρjamρr , the necessary number of
antennas to meet the secrecy constraint under training phase
attack becomes identical to that under no attack. This result
demonstrates the effectiveness of the defense strategy, hiding
the pilot signal assignments from the adversary and expanding
the pilot signal set.
There is a tradeoff between the number, M , of antennas
and the length, Tr, of the training period necessary to satisfy
constraints M ≥ S1() and Tr ≥ max(Mγ ,K) . This tradeoff
is controlled by parameter γ. While choosing γ close to 1
minimizes S1() for any  > 0, it increases the length of the
training period, i.e., the overhead. To observe this: First, S1()
is minimum at γ = 1 due to the fact that min(δ, δ+γ−1) ≤ δ
and equality occurs when γ = 1. Second, increasing γ to 1
also increases training overhead as Tr has to be larger than
S1()
γ .
In Theorem 5, we provide the number of antennas required
to satisfy only the secrecy constraint. Next corollary presents
the number of antennas that BS needs in order to satisfy both
the secrecy and the decodability constraints without need for
stochastic encoding.
Corollary 3. (Any rate tuple is achievable with no need
for stochastic encoding) Let 0 < δ < 1, γ + δ > 1. Let
block length be T and length of data transmission phase be
Td and J be any integer in {1, . . . , Tr}. In the presence
of training-phase jamming, for any  > 0 and any rate
tuple R , [R1, . . . , RK ], if M ≥ max (V1(R), S1()) and
Tr ≥ Mγ , then there exists B() > 0 and a sequence of
codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
, B ≥ B() that satisfy the
constraints in (10) and (11) without a need for stochastic
encoding, where
V1(R) , max
k∈{1,...,K}((
2
Rk
T
Td − 1
)
× (ρf + ρjam + 1)× (ρr + ρjam + 1)
ρrρk
) 1
1−δ
.
2
The proof of Corollary 3 can be found in Appendix E-B.
C. How do we hide the pilot signal assignments?
So far, we have demonstrated that, if pilot signal assign-
ments can be kept secret from the adversary, the impact of
training-phase jamming can be mitigated by increasing the
cardinality of the pilot signal set at the expense of some
increase in training overhead. Next, we discuss how to keep
the assignments secret from the adversary.
In order to communicate the pilot signal assignments se-
curely, at the beginning of each block, the BS shares with
each user a secret key of size logL bits, that is unknown
to the adversary. In the literature, by far the most popular
way to generate an information-theoretically secure secret
key across a wireless channels is via the use of reciprocal
channel gains [17], [18], [19]. However, we cannot use such
channel-gain based methods, since for those methods we
need to observe the channel gains. However, our objective
of generating the keys is to secure the training phase, whose
sole purpose is to observe the channel gains in the first place,
leaving us with a “chicken or the egg” dilemma.
With this observation, let us consider the methods in which
these keys are generated and shared by standard private key
based methods (e.g., Diffie-Hellman [15]) or public key based
methods (e.g., RSA [16]). Thus, it only relies on existing
standard computational cryptographic techniques and does
not rely on information-theoretic techniques for secure key
sharing. Note that a shared key between the BS and a user
is used to encrypt the pilot signal assigned to that user
and the encrypted assignment is communicated to the users
immediately after key sharing.
Despite the use of computational cryptographic methods for
key generation, the security we provide has the “same flavor”
as information theoretic secrecy, as we clarify next. The main
drawback of computational cryptographic methods such as
Diffie-Hellman is that, they make assumptions on the com-
putational power of the adversaries. This kind of security is
based on the supposition that, given that the key is hidden from
an adversary via a difficult puzzle6, it takes an unreasonable
amount of time for an adversary to crack it. Nevertheless, given
enough time, the adversary will eventually decrypt the message
(possibly quickly, given a quantum computer, for instance).
This constitutes the main motivation for information-theoretic
security, which makes no assumptions on the computational
powers of the attackers.
6For example, RSA is based on an NP problem: prime factorization of a
large number.
In our approach, we have a hybrid scheme, combining
information theoretic security and computational cryptogra-
phy. We are using cryptography to hide the pilot sequence
assignments, not the message. Encrypting the pilot signal
assignments is fundamentally different from encrypting the
message. In message encryption, the signal received by the
adversary remains vulnerable to cryptanalysis, long after the
message is transmitted. On the other hand, with pilot signal
assignment encryption, this window of time for cryptanalysis
can be arbitrarily small: unless the adversary figures out the
pilot sequence assigned to the targeted user before the training
phase starts, the knowledge of the assignment becomes useless.
But, we know that the training phase starts immediately after
the encrypted assignment is communicated to the users. If we
define the computational power required for the adversary as
the ratio of amount of computation needed to decrypt the key
via cryptanalysis to the time required to solve the problem,
the computational power necessary for the adversary to make
a damage on the targeted user goes to infinity. This addresses
the shortcoming of existing cryptographic methods due to their
assumptions on computational powers of adversaries. Note
that, if the adversary cannot act during the training phase,
the message transmission is “perfectly secure” as shown in
Theorem 4.
It is important to emphasize that, in the above discussion,
we did not show that the aforementioned defense strategy
achieves information-theoretic security. Instead, we argued
that, utilizing our defense strategy of encrypting training sig-
nals, we can avoid one of the main drawbacks of the existing
computational-cryptographic methods, i.e., assumptions on the
computational power of adversaries.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the physical-layer security of mas-
sive MIMO downlink communication. We first consider no
training-phase jamming attack in which the adversary jams
only the data communication and eavesdrops both the data
communication and training. We show that secure DoF at-
tained in the presence of no training-phase jamming is as
same as the DoF attained under no attack. This result shows
the resilience of the massive MIMO against adversaries not
jamming the training phase. Further, we propose a joint power
allocation and beamforming strategy, called δ-conjugate beam-
foming, using which we can establish information theoretic
security without even a need for Wyner encoding as long as
the number of antennas is above a certain threshold, evaluated
in the sequel.
We next show the vulnerability of massive MIMO systems
against the attack, called training-phase jamming in which the
adversary jams and eavesdrops both the training and data com-
munication. We show that the maximum secure DoF attained
in the presence of training-phase jamming is zero. We then
develop a defense strategy against training-phase jamming.
We show that if the BS keeps the pilot signal assignments
hidden from the adversary and extends the cardinality of the
pilot signal set, a secure DoF equal to the maximum DoF
attained under no attack can be achieved. We finally provide
a discussion why standard computational-cryptographic key
sharing methods can be considered as strong candidates to
encrypt the pilot signal assignments and how they achieve a
level of security that is comparable to information-theoretically
secure key-generation methods.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first evaluate an upper bound on the secure DoF. In
order to derive an upper bound, we assume that there is a
single user and no adversary in the system. Further, we assume
that the user and the BS have a perfect information of the
channel gains. As a last assumption, the user is assumed to
know the received pilot signals at the BS. Hence, with these
assumptions, the communication model in Section 2 reduces to
a multiple input single output (MISO) communication set-up
in which the channel gains and pilot signals are available at the
BS and the user. Note that the capacity, the supremum of the
achievable rates, of this new set-up upper bounds the secrecy
rates achieved under the communication set-up explained in
Section II. We derive the capacity with the following analysis:
C = max
p(xTd |h1,yTr ),E[tr(XTdXTd∗)]≤ρfTd
1
T
I
(
XTd ;Y Td1 |Y Tr , H1
)
(25)
= max
p(xTd |h1),E[tr(XTdXTd∗)]≤ρfTd
1
T
I
(
XTd ;Y Td1 |H1
)
(26)
= max
p(x|h1),E[tr(XX∗)]≤ρf
Td
T
I(X;Y |H1) (27)
= max
E[P (H1)]≤ρf
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + P (H1) ||H1||2
)]
(28)
where XTd is a complex Td ×M matrix and P (·) : CM →
R+ ∪ {0} is a power allocation function. In the derivation
above, (25) follows from Section 7.4.1 of [20] where the
capacity of a communication system in which the channel
gains are available at both encoder and decoder is stated. The
equality in (26) follows from the fact that Y Tr1 → XTd , H1 →
Y Td1 forms a Markov chain and the equality in (27) follows
from the fact that
I
(
XTd ;Y Td1 |H1
)
≤
Td∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|H1) (29)
and from the fact that the equality is attained in (29) if
pXTd |H1
(
xTd |h1
)
=
∏Td
i=1 pX|H1(xi|h1). Then, the RHS and
the LHS of (29) becomes I(X;Y |H1).
In (28), the equality follows from Section of [21], where
the capacity of MISO system is evaluated. In [21], the power
allocation function maximizing (28) is given as
P (h1) =
(
λM − 1||h1||2
)+
,
where λM is a non-negative real number and is chosen such
that E[P (H1)] = ρf . We next find an upper bound on λM
with the following analysis:
ρf = E
[(
λM − 1||H1||2
)+]
≥ λM − E
[
1
||H1||2
]
(30)
= λM − 1
M − 1 (31)
where (30) follows from the fact that 1||H1||2 is distributed with
inverse Gamma distribution and has a mean of 1M−1 . Hence,
we have λM ≤ 1M−1 + ρf for M > 1. We next bound the
DoF of the MISO communication system as
lim
M→∞
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + P (H1) ||H1||2
)]
logM
≤ lim
M→∞
Td
T
E
[
log
(
1 + λM ||H1||2
)]
logM
(32)
≤ lim
M→∞
Td
T
log
(
1 + λME
[||H1||2])
logM
(33)
= lim
M→∞
Td
T
log (1 + λMM)
logM
≤ lim
M→∞
Td
T
log
(
1 + MM−1 +Mρf
)
logM
(34)
=
Td
T
+ lim
M→∞
Td
T
log
(
1
M +
1
M−1 + ρf
)
logM
=
Td
T
, (35)
where (32) follows from the fact that P (·) ≤ λM for all
realizations of H1, (33) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and
(34) follows from (31). In (35), we show that secure DoF
can be at most TdT . 2
Next, we describe an achievability strategy to attain secure
DoF of TdT .
Channel estimation: Pilot signals are mutually orthogonal,
i.e.,
φk × φ∗l =
{
Trρr if k = l
0 if k 6= l
for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The BS employs MMSE for chan-
nel estimation. The estimated gain of the channel connecting
the BS to k-th user is as follows:
Hˆk = aHk + bVk (36)
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where a , ρrTrρrTr+1 , b ,
√
ρrTr
ρrTr+1
, and
Vk is additive Gaussian noise distributed with CN (0, IM ).
Note that E
[
Hˆk
]
= 01×M , E
[
||Hˆk||2
]
= Ma. Further,
for any k ∈ [1 : K] and for any m,n ∈ [1 : M ],
E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗knHkm∣∣∣2] = a2 + a if m = n, otherwise;
E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗kmHkn ∣∣∣2] = a2.
Codebook generation: Pick Rk =
Td
T log
(
1 + Mρkaρf+ρj+1
)
− TdT log (1 +Meρk) and
Rˆk =
Td
T log
(
1 + Mρkaρf+ρj+1
)
− 1 for some 1 > 0 and
for k = 1, . . . ,K. Generate K codebooks, ck, k = 1, . . . ,K,
where K is the number of users. Codebook ck contains
independently and identically generated codewords, sBTdkl ,
l ∈ {1, . . . , 2BTRˆk}, each is drawn from CN(0, ρkIBTd).
Encoding: In order to send k-th user’s message
wk ∈ Wk, the encoder draws index lk from the
uniform distribution that has a sample space of{
(wk − 1) 2BT(Rˆk−Rk) + 1, . . . , wk2BT(Rˆk−Rk)
}
. Note
that this mapping makes the encoder stochastic. The encoder
then maps index lk to the corresponding codeword sBTdklk in
codebook ck.
The encoder employs a conjugate beamforming to map
codewords to channel input sequence XBTd . The channel
input at j-th channel use of i-th block can be written as
follows:
X(i, j) =
K∑
k=1
sklk(i, j)
1√
Mαk
Hˆ∗k(i)
where αk = a for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} due to the fact that
E
[
|Hˆkm |2
]
= a for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
Decoding Each user employs typical set decoding [12].
Let yBTdk be the received signal at k-th user over BTd
channel uses. The decoder at k-th user looks for an unique
index lk ∈
{
1, . . . , 2BTdRk
}
such that
(
sBTdklk , y
BTd
k
)
∈
ABTd
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
, where ABTd
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
is the set of
jointly typical sequences (sBTdk , y
BTd
k ) with
Y Tdk =
1√
Ma
HkHˆ
∗
kS
Td
k
+
1√
Ma
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
HjHˆ
∗
j S
Td
j +Hjam,kVjam + Vk
where STdj is distributed with CN (0, ρkITd), j = 1, . . . ,K
and Vk is distributed with CN (0, ITd).
Probability error and equivocation analysis By the
channel coding theorem [12], E [Pe] → 0 as B → ∞ if
Rˆk <
Td
T I
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
, k = 1, . . . ,K, where expectation is
over random codebooks, C1, . . . ,CK . Note that codebook ck
is the realization of Ck. Define
T0 ,
1√
Ma
SkE
[
HkHˆ
∗
k
]
T1 ,
1√
Ma
Sk
(
E
[
HkHˆ
∗
k
]
−HkHˆ∗k
)
T2 ,
1√
Ma
K∑
j=1,j 6=k
HkHˆ
∗
j Sj
T3 , Hjam,kVjam + Vk.
Note that E [T0] = E [T1] = E [T2] = E [T3] = 0 and
E [T0T ∗1 ] = E [T0T ∗2 ] = E [T0T ∗3 ] = 0. We can bound
Td
T I
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
as
Td
T
I
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
≥ Td
T
log
(
1 +
Var [T0]
Var [T1 + T2 + T3]
)
(37)
=
Td
T
log
(
1 +
Var [T0]
Var [T1] + Var [T2] + Var [T3]
)
(38)
=
Td
T
log
(
1 +
Mρka
ρf + ρjam + 1
)
, (39)
where (37) follows from Theorem 1 of [13] and (38) follows
from the fact that T1, T2, and T3 are uncorrelated random
variables. The equality in (39) follows from the fact that
Var [T0] = Mρka, Var [T1] = ρk, Var [T2] =
∑
j 6=k ρj ,
and Var [T3] = ρjam + 1. From (39), we conclude that
Rˆk ≤ TdT I
(
STdk , Y
Td
k
)
. Hence, E [Pe]→ 0 as B →∞.
We next analyze the secrecy constraint in (11). Let
H (Wk|ZTB , HB , HˆB , HBe ,C
)
be the expectation of the
conditional entropy in (11) over random codebooks C ,
[C1, . . . ,CK ]. We show that the expectation satisfies the con-
straint in (11) for k-th user with the following analysis:
H (Wk|ZBT , GB ,C
) ≥ H (Wk|ZBT , SBTd , GB ,C)
= H (Wk|ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C
)
(40)
= H
(
Wk, S
BTd
k
∣∣∣ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C)
≥ H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZTB , SBTd , GB ,C)
= H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣SBTd , GB ,C)
− I
(
SBTdk ;Z
BTd
∣∣∣SBTd , GB ,C)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C)
= H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Ck)− I (SBTdk ;ZBTd ∣∣∣SBTd , GB ,C)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C) (41)
= BTRˆk − I
(
SBTdk ;Z
BTd
∣∣∣SBTd , GB ,C)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C) (42)
≥ BTRˆk − I
(
SBTdk ,C;Z
BTd
∣∣∣SBTd , GB)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C) (43)
where GB ,
[
HB , HˆB , HBe
]
. Signal set SBTd ,{
SBTdi
}
i6=k
is defined to be the transmitted codewords of
the users except k-th user. Signals ZBTr and ZBTd are the
received signals at the adversary over the training phases and
data communication phases, respectively. Note that ZBT ,[
ZBTr , ZBTd
]
.
In the above derivation (40) follows from the fact that
ZBTr and (GB ,Wk, SBTd , ZBTd ,C) are independent, (41)
follows from the fact that (SBTdk ,Ck) are independent with
(GB , {Ci}i 6=k), and (42) follows from the fact that SBTdk is
uniformly distributed on a set of size 2BTRˆk . We continue the
derivation as
(43) = BTRˆk − I
(
SBTdk ;Z
BTd
∣∣∣SBTd , GB)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C) (44)
≥ BTRˆk
−
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
I (Sk(i, j);Z(i, j)|S(i, j), G(i))
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBTd , SBTd , GB ,C)
≥ BTRˆk
−
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
E
[
log
(
1 +
ρk
Ma
Me∑
m=1
∣∣∣HˆkH∗em ∣∣∣2
)]
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBT , SBTd , GB ,C) (45)
≥ BTRˆk −BTd log
(
1 +
ρk
Ma
Me∑
m=1
E
[∣∣∣HˆkH∗em∣∣∣2]
)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBT , SBTd , GB ,C)
= BTRˆk −BTd log (1 +Meρk)
− H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZBT , SBTd , GB ,C) (46)
≥ BT
(
Rˆk − Td
T
log (1 +Meρk)
)
−BT2 (47)
= BT (Rk − ) (48)
for any 2 > 0 and sufficiently large B, where  , 1 + 2
and Hem in (45) denotes the gain of the channel connecting
m-th antenna at the BS to the adversary. The equality in (44)
follows from the fact that C → STdBk , STdB , GB → ZTdB
forms a Markov chain. The equality in (46) is due to the fact
that E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗kHem ∣∣∣2] = Ma, m = 1, . . . ,Me.
To get the inequality in (47), we need to bound
1
BT H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZTB , SBTd , GB ,C). Define Re , Rˆk −
Rk. Note that Re < 1T I
(
STdk ;Z
Td
∣∣∣STd , G) =
Td
T log (1 +Meρka). Hence, as in (52) of [14], utilizing Fano’s
inequality and the channel coding theorem, we show that
limB→∞ 1BT H
(
SBTdk
∣∣∣Wk, ZTB , SBTd , G,C) = 0.
From the fact that E [Pe] → 0 as B → ∞ and from (48),
we conclude that there exists a sequence of codes satisfying
constraints (10) and (11). We now evaluate degree of freedom
dk associated with Rk as
dk = lim
M→∞
Rk
logM
=
Td
T
+ lim
M→∞
Td
T
log (1 +Meρk)
=
Td
T
for k = 1, . . . ,K. Hence, the attained secure DoF is equal to
Td
T . 2
APPENDIX B
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Note that since the adversary keeps silent during the training
phases, the received signals at the BS over training phases
are independent with HBe . Hence, we conclude that Hˆ
B ,[
HˆB1 , . . . , Hˆ
B
K
]
and HBe are independent.
The BS picks message rates Rk > 0, k = 1, . . . ,K.
The equivocation rate for a code
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
utilizing deterministic encoding mapping functions, fk, k =
1, . . . ,K and δ-conjugate beamforming is as follows:
1
BT
H (Wk|ZBT , GB
)
=
1
BT
H (Wk|ZBTd , GB
)
(49)
≥ 1
BT
H (Wk|ZBTd , SBTd , GB
)
=
1
BT
H (Wk|SBTd , GB
)
− 1
BT
I
(
Wk;Z
BTd
∣∣SBTd , GB)
= Rk − 1
BT
I
(
Wk;Z
BTd
∣∣SBTd , GB) (50)
≥ Rk − 1
BT
I
(
SBTdk ;Z
BTd
∣∣∣SBTd , GB) (51)
≥ Rk − 1
BT
∑
i=1
∑
j=1
I (Sk(i, j);Z(i, j)|S(i, j), G(i))
≥ Rk − 1
BT
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
log
(
1 +
Pk(i, j)
M1+δαk
Me∑
m=1
E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗kHem∣∣∣2]
)
(52)
≥ Rk − Td
T
log
(
1 +
ρk
M1+δαk
Me∑
m=1
E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗kHem ∣∣∣2]
)
(53)
= Rk − Td
T
log
(
1 +
Meρk
Mδ
)
(54)
≥ Rk − 
for any  > 0 and for sufficiently large M , where G ,[
HB , HˆB , HBe
]
. Particularly, for a given  > 0 if M ≥(
Meρk
2
T
Td
−1
) 1
δ
, then there exists a code that satisfies the con-
straint in (12).
In the above derivation, (49) follows from the fact that ZBTr
and (ZBTd , GB ,Wk) are independent, (50) follows from the
facts that Wk is independent with SBTd , GB and uniformly
distributed on [1 : 2BTRk ]. In (51), the inequality follows
from the fact that Wk → SBTdk → ZBTd , SBTd , GB .
In (52), Pk(i, j) , E
∣∣|Sk(i, j)||2], where the expectation is
over Wk. In (53), the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequal-
ity and from the fact that 1BTd
∑B
i=1
∑T
j=Tr+1
Pk(i, j) ≤ ρk.
In (54), the equality follows from the fact Hˆk and Hem are
independent and E
[∣∣∣Hˆ∗kHem∣∣∣2] = Mαk, k = 1, . . . ,K.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
Pick 0 < δ < 1. Pick arbitrary  > 0 and rate tuple R =
[R1, . . . , RK ]. Let M ≥ max(V (R), S()). Note that inequal-
ity M > V (R) implies that Rk < TdT log
(
1 + M
1−δaρk
M−δρf+ρj+1
)
,
k = 1, . . . ,K. We first show that there exists B() > 0
and a sequence of codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
utilizing
δ-beamforming and deterministic mapping, that satisfy the
decodability constraint in (10) for B ≥ B().
The same channel estimation strategy in Appendix A
is used. Codebook generation is as same as the one in
Appendix A. The BS generates K codebooks, ck, k =
1, . . . ,K, where ck contains 2BTRk codewords, sBTdkl , l ∈
{1, . . . , 2BTRk}.
To send k-th user’s message wk ∈Wk =
{
1, . . . , 2BTRk
}
,
the BS maps message wk to the corresponding codeword
sBTdkwk in codebook ck. Note that there is no randomization
in the mapping as opposed to the mapping in the encoding
in Appendix A, where the codeword is a stochastic function
of the message. The BS employs δ-conjugate beamforming to
map codewords to channel input sequence XBTd . The channel
input at j-th channel use of i-th block can be written as
X(i, j) =
K∑
k=1
skwk(i, j)
1√
M1+δαk
Hˆ∗k(i) (55)
where αk = a and a is defined in (36).
The typical set decoding is used at each user as in the
proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A. Hence, since Rk <
1
T I
(
SBTdk ;Y
BTd
k
)
, k = 1, . . . ,K, by the channel coding
theorem, there exists a sequences of codes that satisfy con-
straint (10).
In addition, since M ≥ S(), the sequence of codes
mentioned above satisfy the secrecy constraint in (11) due to
Theorem 2. Hence, the proof of Corollary 1 follows. 2
APPENDIX C
A. Proof of Theorem 3
Throughout the proof, we assume that the BS employs
conjugate beamforming without loss of generality. Suppose
that Rk is an achievable rate. From the constraints (10)-(11)
and Fano’s inequality, we have
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
≥ Rk − δB (56)
1
BT
H (Wk|Y BTdk
)
≤ B (57)
where B and δB go to zero as B →∞.
The LHS of (56) can be written as follows
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
=
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HˆB , HBe
)
(58)
=
1
BT
H
(
Wk|Z˜BTd , H˜B , HBk
)
(59)
=
1
BT
H
(
Wk|Z˜BTd , H˜B , HB
)
(60)
where H˜(i) ,
[
Hˆ1(i), . . . , H˜k(i), . . . , HˆK(i)
]
and
Z˜(i, j) , 1√
Mαk
Hk(i)H˜
∗
k(i)Sk(i, j)
+
K∑
l=1,l 6=k
1√
Mαl
Hl(i)H˜
∗
l (i)Sl(i, j) +W (61)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ B and Td + 1 ≤ j ≤ T . The
equality in (58) follows from the fact that HB →
ZBTd , HˆB , HBe →Wk forms a Markov chain and the equality
in (59) follows from the fact that the joint distribution of
Wk, Z
BTd , HBe , Hˆ
B
1 , . . . , Hˆ
B
k , . . . Hˆ
B
K is identical with that of
Wk, Z˜
BTd , HBk , Hˆ
B
1 , . . . , H˜
B
k , . . . , Hˆ
B
K . The equality in (60)
follows from the fact that HB/HBk → Z˜BTd , HˆB1 , H˜B →Wk
forms a Markov chain.
The upper bound on Rk can be derived with the following
steps:
Rk ≤ 1
BT
H (Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
− 1
BT
H (Wk|Y BTdk
)
+ γB (62)
=
1
BT
H (Wk| Z˜BTd , H˜B , HB
)
− 1
BT
H (Wk|Y BTdk
)
+ γB (63)
≤ 1
BT
H (Wk| Z˜BTd , H˜B , HB
)
− 1
BT
H (Wk| Z˜BTd , H˜B , HB
)
+ γB (64)
=
1
BT
I
(
Wk;Y
BTd
k
∣∣∣ Z˜BTd , H˜B , HB)
≤ 1
BT
I
(
SBTd ;Y BTdk
∣∣∣ Z˜BTd , GB)+ γB (65)
≤ 1
BT
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
I (S(i, j);Yk(i, j)| Z˜(i, j), G
)
+ γB
(66)
=
∫
1
BT
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
I (S(i, j);Yk(i, j)|Z(i, j), g)
pG(g) dg + γB , (67)
where γB , B + δB , GB ,
[
HB , H˜B
]
, and G ,
[
H, H˜
]
.
In the derivation above, (62) follows from (56) and (57),
and (64) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces the
entropy. The inequality in (65) follows from the fact that
Wk → SBTd → Y BTdk , Z˜Td , GB . The inequality in (66)
follows from the memoryless property of the channel and from
the assumption in Theorem 3, stating that
(
H˜(i), H(i)
)
have
an identical probability distribution for any i ≥ 1. We continue
the upper bound derivation with the following steps:
(67) ≤
∫
1
BT
B∑
i=1
T∑
j=Tr+1
I (SG(i, j);Yk(i, j)| Z˜(i, j), g
)
pG(g) dg + γB (68)
≤ Td
T
∫
I (SG;Yk|Z, g) pG(g) dg + γB (69)
≤ Td
T
∫ [
max
Σ∈S
(log (1 + ckΣc
∗
k)−
log (1 + ceΣc
∗
e))]
+
pG(g) dg + γB (70)
≤ Td
T
E
[
max
Σ∈S
([log (1 + CkΣC
∗
k)−
log (1 + CeΣC
∗
e )]
+
)]
+ γB , (71)
where Ck and Ce are 1 × K random vectors and are de-
fined as Ck ,
[
HkHˆ
∗
1√
Mα1
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
k√
Mαk
, . . .
HkHˆ
∗
K√
MαK
]
and Ce ,[
HkHˆ
∗
1√
Mα1
, . . . ,
HkH˜
∗
k√
Mαk
, . . . ,
HkHˆ
∗
K√
MαK
]
. Further, ck and ce are the
realizations of Ck and Ce, respectively. Define Σij as K ×K
covariance matrix of Sk(i, j). Note that Σij is a diagonal
matrix due to the fact that each component of S(i, j) are
independent. The inequality (68) follows from (41) of [23],
where SG(i, j) in (68) is distributed with CN (0K×K ,Σij).
Define f(Σij) , I (SG(i, j);Yk(i, j)| Z˜(i, j), g
)
. The in-
equality in (69) follows from Jensen’s inequality and Propo-
sition 5 of [23] that states f(Σij) is a concave func-
tion of Σij . Note that SG in (69) is distributed with
CN
(
0, 1BTd
∑B
i=1
∑T
j=Tr+1
Σij
)
. The inequality in (70) fol-
lows from (139) of [23], where S is a set of covariance
matrices and defined as
S , {Σ : Σ  diag (ρ1, . . . , ρK)
and Σ is a diagonal matrix} (72)
We can rewrite the random variable inside the expectation as
max
Σ∈S
([
log
(
1 +
1
M
CkΣC
∗
k
)
−
log
(
1 +
1
M
CeΣC
∗
e
)]+)
(73)
= max
Σ∈S
log
 1
M
+ ρk(G)vk(G) +
K∑
l 6=k
ρl(G)vl(G)

− log
 1
M
+ ρk(G)wk(G) +
K∑
l 6=k
ρl(G)vl(G)
+ (74)
with probability 1, where ρk(G) is defined to be k-th element
on the diagonal of Σ, i.e., Σ , diag (ρ1(G), . . . , ρK(G)).
Note that
0 ≤ ρl(G) ≤ ρl, l = 1, . . . ,K,
due to (72). In (74), we define
vl(G) ,
1
αlM2
∣∣∣HkHˆ∗l ∣∣∣2
for l = 1, . . . ,K and wk(G) , 1αkM2
∣∣∣HkH˜∗k ∣∣∣2. We continue
to simplify (73) with the following:
(74) =
[
max
ρk(G):0≤ρk(G)≤ρk
(
log
(
1
M
+ ρk(G)vk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρk(G)wk(G)
))]+
(75)
=
[(
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
))]+
(76)
with probability 1, where (75) follows from the fact that
f(x) = [log(a+ x)− log(b+ x)]+ is a non-increasing func-
tion if x ≥ 0, where a and b are positive real num-
bers. The equality in (76) follows from the fact g(x) =[
log
(
1
M + ax
)− log ( 1M + bx)]+ is non-decreasing if x ≥ 0
where a and b are non-negative real numbers and M ≥ 1.
We now bound Rk as follows:
Rk ≤ Td
T
E
[[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+]
+ γB (77)
=
Td
T
E
[[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+]
(78)
where (77) follows from (71) and from the fact that (73) =
(76) with probability 1 and (78) follows from the fact that
limB→∞ γB = 0.
We now bound the secure degree of freedom of k-th user
as follows
dk = lim
M→∞
Rk
logM
≤ lim
M→∞
Td
T
E
[[
log (1 +Mρkvk(G))
logM
− log (1 +Mρkwk(G))
logM
]+]
(79)
=
Td
T
E
[
lim
M→∞
[
log (1 +Mρkvk(G))
logM
− log (1 +Mρkwk(G))
logM
]+]
, (80)
where (79) follows from (78) and (80) follows form the domi-
nant convergence theorem. To apply the dominant convergence
theorem, we need to show that random variable
t(M) ,
[
log (1 +Mρkvk(G))
logM
− log (1 +Mρkwk(G))
logM
]+
(81)
is upper and lower bounded by random variables that have a
finite limit for M > 1. Note that t(M) is lower bounded by
zero and upper bounded by
t+(M) , log (1 +Mρkvk(G))
logM
for any M > 1 since the second log(·) term in (81) is non-
negative. We next upper bound E [t+(M)] as follows:
E
[
t+(M)
]
= E
[
log
(
1
M + ρkvk(G)
)
logM
]
+ 1 (82)
≤ E
[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)]
+ 1
≤ log (1 + ρkE [vk(G)]) + 1 (83)
≤ log (1 + ρk (γk + pik)) + 1 (84)
<∞, (85)
where γk ,
∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2, pik , E [∣∣∣HkmHˆ∗km∣∣∣2]. In
the derivation above, (83) follows from Jensen’s inequality
and (84) follows from the fact that E
[∣∣∣HkHˆ∗k ∣∣∣2] =(
M2 −M) ∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2 + ME [∣∣∣HkmHˆ∗km ∣∣∣2] =(
M2 −M) γk +Mpik.
We continue the derivation of the upper bound on dk with
the following:
(80) =
Td
T
E
[[
lim
M→∞
log
(
1
M + ρkvk(G)
)
logM
− lim
M→∞
log
(
1
M + ρkwk(G)
)
logM
]+ (86)
= 0, (87)
where (86) follows from the fact [·] is a continuous function.
In order to show the equality in (87), first note that
lim
M→∞
vk(G) = lim
M→∞
1
αkM2
∣∣∣HkHˆ∗k ∣∣∣2
= lim
M→∞
1
αkM
M∑
m=1
HkmHˆ
∗
km×
lim
M→∞
1
M
M∑
m=1
H∗kmHˆkm
=
1
αk
∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2 , (88)
with probability 1, where (88) follows from the strong law of
large numbers. In a similar way we can show that
lim
M→∞
wk(G) =
1
αk
E
[∣∣∣HkmH˜∗km∣∣∣2]
=
1
αk
∣∣∣E [HemHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2 (89)
with probability 1, where (89) follows from the fact that the
joint probability distribution of
(
He, Hˆk
)
is identical with that
of
(
Hk, H˜k
)
. Hence, we have
lim
M→∞
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
= log
(
lim
M→∞
ρkvk(G)
)
= log
(
ρk
αk
∣∣∣E [HkmHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2) (90)
with probability 1. Further, we have
lim
M→∞
log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)
= log
(
lim
M→∞
ρkwk(G)
)
= log
(
ρk
αk
∣∣∣E [HemHˆ∗km]∣∣∣2) (91)
with probability 1. The equality in (87) follows by combin-
ing (90) and (91). Hence, the proof ends.
The proof of Theorem 3 for the case in which the BS
employs δ-conjugate beamforming can be done in the similar
way. One only needs to replace ckΣc∗k and ceΣc
∗
e in (70) with
1
Mδ
ckΣc
∗
k and
1
Mδ
ceΣc
∗
e , respectively and change the rest of
the proof accordingly.
2
B. Proof of Corollary 2
Assume that the BS employs conjugate beamforming with-
out loss of generality. Note that from (78), we have following
upper bound:
lim
M→∞
Rk = lim
M→∞
Td
T
E
[[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+]
=
Td
T
E
[
lim
M→∞
[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+]
(92)
where (92) follows from the dominant convergence theorem.
To apply the dominant convergence theorem, we need to show
that random variable
g(M) ,
[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+
is upper and lower bounded by random variables that have a
finite limit for M > 1. Note that g(M) is lower bounded by
zero and upper bounded by
g(M) ≤
[
log
(
1
M
+ ρkvk(G)
)
− log
(
1
M
+ ρkwk(G)
)]+
≤ log (2 + ρkvk(G) + ρkwk(G))− log (ρkwk(G)) (93)
with probability 1 for any M > 1. Noting the analysis in (82)-
(85), in order to show (93) is upper bounded by a random
variable that has a finite expectation, it is sufficient to show
the expectation of second log(·) term in (93) has a finite lower
bound. Hence,
E [log (ρkwk(G))] = log ρk + E [log (wk(G))]
= log ρk + E [log (wk(G))]
= log ρk − logαk + E [log (KM )] (94)
≥ log ρk − logαk +
∫
log(x)pKM (x) dx
≥ log ρk − logαk +
∫ 1
0
log(x)pKM (x) dx
≥ log ρk − logαk +
∫ 1
0
log(x)r dx (95)
= log ρk − logαk − r log e
> −∞,
where r is defined in the statement of Corollary 2. In (94),
the equality follows from the definition of KM in Corollary 2
and from the fact that the joint probability distribution of(
He, Hˆk
)
is identical with that of
(
Hk, H˜k
)
. In (95), the
inequality follows from the assumption in Corollary 2. The
rest of the proof follows from Appendix C-A
The proof for the case the BS employs δ-conjugate beam-
forming follows from the same argument at the end of Ap-
pendix C-A 2
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The length, Tr of training phase has to be identical to at
least the size of the pilot signal set L so that the BS can
generate L ≥ K mutually orthogonal pilot signals. Let J
be any integer in set {1, . . . , Tr}. In order to estimate k-th
user’s channel, the BS first projects the received signal during
the training phase Y Tr indicated in (21) to φk. Then, the BS
normalizes the projected signal and estimates the gain of the
channel connecting the BS to k-th user at i-th block as
Hˆk(i) = x1
(√
TrρrHk(i)
+Πi
Me∑
n=1
√
Trρjam
MeJ
He(i) + Vk
)
(96)
for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where E
[
||Hˆk(i)||2
]
= 1, Vk is
distributed as CN(0, IM ) for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, x1 ,
1√
M
√
Trρr+1+Tr
ρjam
J
and {Πi}i≥1 is an i.i.d Bernoulli pro-
cess, where P(Πi = 1) = JL . Event {Πi = 1} indicates that
the set of pilot signals the adversary contaminates at i-th block
contains k-th user’s pilot signal.
Utilizing stochastic encoding and conjugate beamforming
as in the proof Theorem 1, we can show that rate
Rk =
[
Td
T
log
(
1 +
Mρka
ρf + ρjam + 1
)
−Td
T
log
(
1 +Meρk +
MMeρkρjama
Lρr
)]+
(97)
for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is achievable, where a ,
Trρr
Trρr+1+Tr
ρjam
L
. Notice that the rate in (97) does not depend
on J . We can rewrite Rk as
Rk =
[
Td
T
log
(
1 +
MρkρrTr
(ρf + ρjam + 1)(ρrTr + ρjam + 1)
)
−Td
T
log
(
1 +Meρk +
MeMρkρjam
ρrTr + ρjam + 1
)]+
(98)
due to the fact that L = Tr. Suppose γ ≤ 1. We bound Rk as
follows
Rk ≥ Td
T
[
log
(
1 +
MρkρrM
γ
(ρf + ρjam + 1)(ρrMγ + ρjam + 1)
)
− log
(
1 +Meρk +
MeMρkρjam
ρrMγ + ρjam + 1
)]+
(99)
≥Td
T
[
logM + log
(
ρkρr
(ρf + ρjam + 1)(ρr + ρjam + 1)
)
−(1− γ) logM − log
(
1 +Meρk +
Meρkρjam
ρr
)]+
=
Td
T
[
γ logM − log
((
1 +Meρk +
Meρkρjam
ρr
)
×(ρf + ρjam + 1)ρr + ρjam + 1
ρkρr
)]+
(100)
where (99) follows from the fact that Tr ≥ Mγ . Notice that
the second logarithm term in (100) does not depend on M .
Hence, we observe that RklogM ≥ TdT γ −  if M ≥ G(). In a
similar way, for γ > 1, we can show that RklogM ≥ TdT −  if
M ≥ G().
APPENDIX E
A. Proof of Theorem 5
We set the size of the pilot signal set L to Tr. Let J be
any integer in set {1, . . . , Tr}. The BS uses the same strategy
explained in the proof of Theorem 4 in order to estimate the
gains of channels connecting the BS to users.
The BS picks arbitrary message rates Rk > 0,
k = 1, . . . ,K. The equivocation rate for a code(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
utilizing deterministic encoding
mapping functions, fk, k = 1, . . . ,K and δ-conjugate beam-
forming is as follows:
1
BT
H
(
Wk|ZBTd , HB , HˆB , HBe
)
≥ Rk − Td
T
log
(
1 +
Meρk
Mδ
+
M1−δMeρkρjama
Lρr
)
(101)
= Rk − Td
T
log
(
1 +
Meρk
Mδ
+
M1−δMeρkρjam
ρrTr + Tr + 1
)
(102)
≥ Rk − Td
T
log
(
1 +
Meρk
Mδ
+M1−δ−γ
Meρkρjam
ρr
)
(103)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where a is defined in (97) and Hˆk(i)
for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and i ∈ {1, . . . , B} is given in (96).
In the above derivation, (101) follows from a derivation that
is similar to (49)-(54) in Appendix B-A, (102) follows from
the fact the cardinality of pilot signal set L is chosen as Tr
and (103) follows from the fact that Tr ≥Mγ .
As δ + γ > 1, the RHS of (103) goes to zero as M →∞.
For any  > 0, M ≥ S1() implies that right hand side of
(103) is smaller than , completing the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 3
We set the size of the pilot signal set L to Tr. Let J be
any integer in set {1, . . . , Tr}. The BS uses the same strategy
explained in the proof of Theorem 4 in order to estimate the
gains of channels connecting the BS to users.
Pick δ and γ such that 0 < δ < 1 and γ + δ > 1.
Pick any arbitrary  > 0 and arbitrary rate tuple R =
[R1, . . . , RK ]. Choose M such that M ≥ max(V1(R), S1()).
Note that inequality M ≥ V1(R) implies that Rk ≤
Td
T log
(
1 + M
1−δρka
M−δρf+ρjam+1
)
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where
a is defined in (97). As in the proof of Corollary 1, we
can show that there exists B() > 0 and a sequence of
codes
(
2BTR1 , . . . , 2BTRK , BTd
)
that satisfy the decodability
constraint in (10) for B ≥ B(), when δ-beamforming,
combined with deterministic mapping is used. In addition,
since M ≥ S1() and Tr ≥ Mγ , following Theorem 5,
the sequence of codes mentioned above satisfy the constraint
in (11), completing the proof.
REFERENCES
[1] H. Yang, and T. L. Marzetta, “Performance of conjugate and zero-forcing
beamforming in large-scale antenna systems,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications , vol. 31, no:2, pp:172-179, Feb. 2013
[2] Y. Ozan Basciftci and C. Emre Koksal, “How different is security
with massive MIMO?”, In UCSD Information Theory Applications
(ITA), 2015, http://ita.ucsd.edu/workshop/15/files/abstract/abstract 1300.
txt, Feb. 2015.
[3] T. L. Marzetta, “Multi-cellular wireless with base stations employing
unlimited numbers of antennas,” in Proc. UCSD Inf. Theory Applications
Workshop, Feb. 2010.
[4] T. L. Marzetta, “Noncooperative cellular wireless with unlimited numbers
of base station antennas,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 9, no. 11,
pp. 3590–3600, Nov. 2010.
[5] L. Lu, G. Li, A. Swindlehurst, A. Ashikhmin, and R. Zhang , “An
overview of massive MIMO: benefits and challenges,” IEEE Journal of
Selected Topics in Signal Processing, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 742-758, Oct.
2014.
[6] J. Jose, A. Ashikhmin, T.L. Marzetta, and S. Vishwanath, “Pilot contam-
ination and precoding in multi-cell TDD systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 10. no. 8, pp. 2640–2651, Aug. 2011.
[7] H. Q. Ngo, E. G. Larsson, and T. L. Marzetta, “Energy and spectral
efficiency of very large multiuser MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun,
vol. 61, no. 4, pp. 1436–1449, April 2013.
[8] R. R. Muller, L. Cottatellucci, and M. Vehkapera, “Blind pilot decontam-
ination,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing, vol. 8,
no. 5, pp. 773–786, October 2014.
[9] J. Zhu, R. Schober, and V. Bhargava, “Secure transmission in multicell
massive MIMO systems, IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 9,
Sept. 2014, pp. 4766–4781.
[10] A. D.Wyner, “The wire-tap channel”. Bell Syst. Tech. J., 54(8):1355–
1387.
[11] T. L. Marzetta, “How much training is required for multiuser MIMO?”,
Fortieth Asilomar Conf. on Signals, Systems, & Computers, Pacific Grove,
CA, Oct. 2006.
[12] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. New
York: Wiley, 1991
[13] B. Hassibi and B. Hochwald, “How much training is needed in multiple-
antenna wireless links?, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 49, pp. 951–963,
Apr. 2003
[14] Y. O. Basciftci, O. Gungor, C. E. Koksal, and F. Ozguner “On the secrecy
capacity of block fading channels with a hybrid adversary?, IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 61, no. 3, pp. 1325–1343, March 2015.
[15] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 644–654, Nov. 1976.
[16] R. L. Rivest, A.Shamir, and L.Adleman, “A method for obtaining
signatures and public-key cryptosystems”, Commun. ACM, vol. 21, no.
2, pp.120–126, Feb.1978.
[17] R. Wilson, D. Tse, and R. A. Scholtz, “Channel identification: Secret
sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform.
Forensics and Security, vol. 2, pp. 364–375, Sept. 2007.
[18] C. Ye, S. Mathur, A. Reznik, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam,
“Information-theoretic key generation from wireless channels,” IEEE
Trans. Inform. Forensics and Security, vol. 5, pp. 240254, Jun. 2010.
[19] L. Lai, Y. Liang, and H. V. Poor, “A unified framework for key
agreement over wireless fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inform. Forensics
and Security, vol. 7, pp. 480–490, Apr. 2012.
[20] A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network Information Theory. Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2012
[21] D. N. C. Tse and P. Viswanath, Fundamentals of Wireless Communica-
tions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005
[22] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple
antennas II: The MIMOME wiretap channel, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
vol. 56, no. 11, pp. 5515-5532, Nov. 2010.
[23] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap
channel, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug.
2011
